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DOMESTIC ASSET PROTECTION TRUSTS: WHAT’S THE BIG DEAL? 
BY DARSI NEWMAN SIRKNEN∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
 Within the last decade, a few American states have enacted legislation 
allowing self-settled spendthrift trusts, or “asset protection trusts” (“APTs”).  Before 
these statutes were enacted, a number of foreign countries recognized these trusts, 
but they had never before been recognized in the United States.1  Professors, 
practicing lawyers, and other scholars have written numerous articles concerning this 
relatively new device.  Several of these articles have been negative, expressing outrage 
that such “court and creditor thwarting”2 trusts that are “an affront to the public 
policy of the other . . . states”3 have moved from their traditional offshore homes to 
take up residence in the United States.  But is all the outrage really justified?  This 
paper examines the domestic APT and offers the conclusion that the APT is worth 
far less attention than authors recently have given it. 
I.  TRADITIONAL RULE: NO SELF-SETTLED SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS 
 The APT seems to defy traditional rules because it allows a settlor to transfer 
assets to the trust, retain an equitable interest in those assets, and yet protect those 
assets from creditor claims through the use of a spendthrift provision—a provision 
prohibiting voluntary or involuntary alienation of a beneficiary’s interest in a trust.  
However, section 156 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts states that a spendthrift 
provision in a self-settled trust is invalid as to claims made by the settlor’s creditors.4  
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1 Available offshore jurisdictions include Bermuda, the Bahamas, the Cook Islands, the Jersey Islands, 
and Nevis. Henry J. Lischer, Jr., Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: Pallbearers to Liability?, 35 REAL PROP. 
PROB. & TR. J. 479, 503 (2000) [hereinafter Pallbearers]. 
2 Id. at 542. 
3 Randall J. Gingiss, Putting a Stop to “Asset Protection” Trusts, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 987, 992 (1999) 
[hereinafter Gingiss]. 
4 Cases adopting this Restatement rule include Markham v. Fay, 74 F.3d 1347 (1st Cir. 1996); In re 
Jordan, 914 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1990); In re Brooks, 844 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1988); In re Robbins, 826 
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This is the case even without proof of fraudulent intent on the part of the settlor in 
making the transfer to the trust.  Another example of a traditional rule that 
disapproves of APTs is section 505 of the Uniform Trust Code, which provides that, 
in the case of a self-settled discretionary trust, the settlor’s creditors may reach the 
maximum amount that the trustee could pay to the settlor, regardless of whether the 
trustee actually distributes the money or whether the trust contains a spendthrift 
provision.5   
II. OVERVIEW OF ASSET PROTECTION TRUSTS 
 Before domestic states began authorizing the use of APTs, United States 
citizens could transfer assets to offshore APTs in foreign jurisdictions including the 
Bahamas, the Channel Islands, the Jersey Islands, and Nevis.6  The following section 
outlines the terms that United States grantors commonly include in offshore trusts 
and the advantages of each.  Section II.B summarizes the recent domestic legislation 
authorizing APTs and compares the trusts permitted by the domestic statutes with 
the offshore trusts.  
A.  Offshore Trusts 
 As noted above, United States law has not been friendly to the APT.  For 
this reason, several foreign countries began allowing APTs, thus attracting capital 
from United States settlors interested in protecting their wealth from creditors.7  
Foreign jurisdictions are attractive because their courts are not required to enforce 
United States judgments.8  An estimate from the year 2000 reported that United 
                                                                                                                                     
F.2d 293 (4th Cir. 1987); Ahern v. Thomas, 733 A.2d 756 (Conn. 1999); Brent v. Md. Cent. Collection 
Unit, 537 A.2d 227 (Md. Ct. App. 1988);  Cohen v. Comm’r of Div. of Med. Assistance, 668 N.E.2d 
769 (Mass. 1996); In re Hertsberg Inter Vivos Trust, 578 N.W.2d 289 (Mich. 1998). 
5 The Uniform Trust Code was adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws in 2000.  For statutes adopting § 505 with minimal changes, see D.C. CODE ANN. § 19-
1305.05 (LexisNexis 2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58a-505 (2006); MO. REV. STAT. § 456.5-505 (2006); 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3850 (2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:5-505 (LexisNexis 2006); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 35-15-505 (2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-505 (2006).  
6 Pallbearers, supra note 1, at 503. 
7 Henry J. Lischer, Jr., Professional Responsibility Issues Associated with Asset Protection Trusts, 39 REAL PROP. 
PROB. & TR. J. 561, 567 (2004). 
8 Id. at 568. 
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States citizens had transferred $300 million in assets to foreign trusts and that the 
total amount of American money in offshore trusts exceeded $1 billion.9  The 
number of Americans settling offshore trusts was estimated at around 100,000.10 
 Offshore trusts have several features that add to their invulnerability to 
creditor attacks.  For example, they usually have a “protector” whose consent is 
required before the trustee can perform certain acts.11  The protector may replace a 
trustee at any time and also may be able to change the trust beneficiaries.12  In 
addition, offshore trusts often contain an “anti-duress clause,” which mandates that 
the trustee is not to honor a request if it is made under legal compulsion (i.e., a court 
order to repatriate assets to the United States).13  These trusts also often exclude 
certain people from becoming a beneficiary, trustee, or protector.  In most cases, 
anyone appointed by a court is excluded.14  Finally, the trust instrument may provide 
for a change of trust situs if the assets are put in danger.15  Many creditors are not 
willing to follow a trust as it flees from one jurisdiction to another, perhaps making 
several situs changes before the creditor finally throws its proverbial towel into the 
ring.16 
 Several United States courts have had occasion to rule on the validity of 
offshore APTs.  Because of traditional United States rules, these courts have been 
consistently hostile to the offshore trusts.17 
                                                 
9 Pallbearers, supra note 1, at 502. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 506. 
12 Id. at 506-07. 
13 Id. at 507. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 508. 
16 Id. 
17 See, e.g., In re Lawrence, 279 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2002); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Affordable Media, 
LLC, 179 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1999); In re Brooks, 217 B.R. 98 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1998); In re Portnoy, 
201 B.R. 685 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (although the foreign choice-of-law provision in the trust 
instrument could bind the debtor and his trustee, it could not bind the debtor’s creditors); Breitenstine 
v. Breitenstine, 62 P.3d 587 (Wyo. 2003) (where one spouse transferred marital property to an 
  
136            TRANSACTIONS:  THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW           [Vol. 8 
 
B.  Domestic Trusts 
 Alaska enacted the first domestic APT statute in 1997.18  In the years that 
followed, Delaware, Nevada, Rhode Island, and Utah passed statutes allowing APTs.  
Each state’s statute requires that at least one trustee be located in the host state, that 
the trust instrument invoke the host state’s law, that part of the trust res be held 
within the host state, and that part of the trust administration occur in the host 
state.19  Each statute offers protection from the settlor’s creditors if the settlor is 
merely a discretionary beneficiary of the trust.20  Delaware, however, goes one step 
further and allows creditor protection even if the settlor retains the right to the trust 
income during his life.21 
 There are several advantages of domestic APTs over foreign APTs.  The 
most obvious is that the settlor can avoid the uncertainties of transferring property 
to a jurisdiction that has a different language, political system, legal structure, and 
currency.22  In addition, the United States is unquestionably more politically and 
economically stable than any of the offshore APT host countries.  Another 
advantage of domestic trusts is that they allow the settlor to avoid the foreign trust 
reporting requirements imposed by the Internal Revenue Code.23 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
offshore trust without the knowledge or consent of the other spouse and the court lacked jurisdiction 
to direct judgment on the out-of-state property).  In Affordable Media and Lawrence, the court ordered 
the debtor imprisoned for contempt for refusing to repatriate assets. 
18 Gingiss, supra note 3, at 1008; Pallbearers, supra note 1, at 508.  
19 See ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.035 (2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3570 (2006); NEV. REV. STAT. 
166.015 (2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-9.2-2 (2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-6-14 (2006). 
20  Pallbearers, supra note 1, at 516. 
21 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3570(10)(b)(3) (2006). 
22 Pallbearers, supra note 1, at 515. 
23 Id.; see also I.R.C. § 6048 (2006). 
2006]        DOMESTIC ASSET PROTECTION TRUSTS: WHAT’S THE BIG DEAL?          137            
1.  Alaska 
 Alaska’s Trust Act became effective April 2, 1997.24  It was amended in 1998 
and 2003.25  Under the amended Act, a creditor existing at the time of the transfer to 
the trust must bring an action to set aside the transfer as fraudulent within the later 
of four years after the date of the transfer or one year after the date the creditor 
discovers the transfer, and the creditor must prove that he asserted a claim before 
the settlor made the transfer.26  In addition, the Act requires a creditor to prove a 
fraudulent transfer by proof of actual fraud (i.e., “intent” to defraud the creditor), 
rather than merely constructive fraud (i.e., if the settlor had incurred large debts or 
reasonably believed that he would be incurring such debts in the near future at the 
time he made the transfer to the trust).27  Alaska’s statute provides that, if a court sets 
aside the trust as a fraudulent transfer, the trustee has a first lien against the trust 
property in an amount equal to the trustee’s cost of defending the action.28  After the 
trustee’s lien is satisfied, the creditor may defeat the transfer to the trust only to the 
extent necessary to pay its claim and related costs.29 
 There are two significant disadvantages to the Alaska Act.  First, it does not 
define “creditor,” which could allow courts to broaden the class of possible 
plaintiffs.30  Second, Alaska has adopted the Uniform Foreign Money Judgments 
Recognition Act, which extends the “full faith and credit” given to other states’ 
judgments to judgments of foreign countries as well.31 
 
                                                 
24  Gingiss, supra note 3, at 1008. 
25 See 2003 Alaska Sess. Laws 138; 1998 Alaska Sess. Laws 105.  
26 ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110(d) (2006).   
27 Id. § 34.40.110(b)(1). 
28 Id. § 13.36.310(c)(1).  
29 Id. § 13.36.310(b).   
30 Richard W. Nenno, Planning with Domestic Asset Protection Trusts, SJ036 ALI-ABA 421, 499 (ALI-ABA 
C.L.E. Annual Advanced Course of Study Nov. 17-21, 2003) [hereinafter Planning with APTs].  
31See ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.30.100-.180 (2006).  
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2.  Delaware 
 The Delaware Qualified Dispositions in Trust Act was signed into law on 
July 9, 1997.32  It has been amended several times since then.  The Act requires the 
trust to invoke Delaware law, be irrevocable, and contain statutory spendthrift 
language.33  The Delaware Act does not protect the trust property from existing 
claims for alimony (but only if the former spouse was married to the settlor before 
the trust was created), child support, division of marital property, or existing tort 
judgments.34  However, these exceptions would probably exist even if they were not 
named in the statute, because public policy dictates against allowing former spouses 
or children to go without support while settlors maintain their standards of living 
with funds received from a trust.35   
 For purposes of the Delaware Act, a “qualified trustee” is any person 
“authorized by the law of [Delaware] to act as a trustee and whose activities are 
subject to supervision by the Bank Commissioner of the State, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, the Comptroller of the Currency, or the Office of Thrift 
Supervision.”36  Although the trust instrument may appoint co-trustees not fitting 
this description, the Delaware trustee must hold some of the trust property in 
Delaware and “materially participate in the administration of the trust.”37  If any 
court declines to apply Delaware law in a proceeding against the trustee, the trustee 
ceases to act and a successor trustee will take its place.38 
 As in Alaska, creditors with existing claims at the time of the settlor’s transfer 
must bring any action to defeat the disposition within the latter of four years after 
the disposition or within one year after the creditor discovered or should have 
discovered the transfer.39  The creditor must prove by clear and convincing evidence 
                                                 
32 71 Del. Laws 159 (1997).  
33 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3570(10) (2006).   
34Id. at tit. 12, § 3573.. 
35 Planning with APTs, supra note 30, at 447; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 59 (2003). 
36 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3570(9)(a) (2006). 
37 Planning with APTs, supra note 29, at 444. 
38 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3572(g) (2006). 
39Id. at tit. 12, § 3572(b).. 
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that the transfer was fraudulent.40  Any creditor claims arising after the transfer must 
be brought within four years of the transfer, but this exception is available only to 
creditors who existed or were foreseeable at the time of the transfer.41  If there are 
multiple creditor claims, each creditor must bring a separate suit attacking the trust.42  
As in Alaska, the trustee may use trust assets to pay the costs of litigation before it 
satisfies a successful claim.43 
3.  Rhode Island 
 Rhode Island’s Qualified Dispositions in Trust Act became effective July 1, 
1999.44  It is virtually identical to the original, unamended Delaware Act.   Unlike the 
Delaware Act, however, the Rhode Island Act has no provision protecting trustees 
and attorneys who engage in what later turns out to be a fraudulent transfer and no 
provision allowing corporations and other entities, in addition to individuals, to 
create APTs.45 
 A Rhode Island APT must be irrevocable and invoke Rhode Island Law.46  It 
also must contain a spendthrift clause and have a qualified trustee, which is defined 
the same as under the Delaware statute.47  The Rhode Island Act bars original actions 
against the trust as well as actions for enforcement of judgments obtained in other 
                                                 
40 Id. 
41 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3572(b)(2) (2006); see also Richard W. Nenno, Perpetual Dynasty Trusts, 
UPAIA Section 104 and Total Return Trust Statutes, and Domestic Asset Protection Trusts, SH022 ALI-ABA 
1843, 1941 (ALI-ABA C.L.E. Course of Study Nov. 18-22, 2002).  
42 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3574(a) (2006). 
43 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3574(b)(1) (2006). 
44 1999 R.I. Pub. Laws 402.  
45 Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3572(d) & (e) (2006), and DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3570(8) & 
(11) (2006), with R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-9.2-4(a) (2005), and R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-9.2-2(7) (2005). 
46 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-9.2-2(9) (2006). 
47 See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-9.2-2(8) (2006). 
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jurisdictions.48  It also states that any action to set aside a transfer must be based on 
Rhode Island’s version of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.49 
4.  Nevada 
 Nevada’s APT legislation became effective October 1, 1999.50  In order to 
protect the settlor from creditor’s claims, the trust must be irrevocable; the settlor 
must retain no right to mandatory distributions of income or principal; and the 
transfer of property to the trust must not have been “intended to hinder, delay or 
defraud known creditors.”51  The settlor of the trust must be a Nevada resident, or 
there must be a qualified trustee.52  The Nevada statute contains a provision that 
makes Nevada trusts considerably less protective than those of the other APT states.  
It allows an action for enforcement of a judgment obtained in another state for up to 
six years after the date of the judgment.53 
5.  Utah 
 Utah’s APT legislation became effective December 31, 2003.54  The Utah Act 
provides seven exceptions, under which creditors may reach trust property to satisfy 
their claims.  The exceptions are 1) existing claims for child or spousal support; 2) 
claims for state taxes or state public assistance; 3) any claim if the settlor retains a 
right to mandatory distributions; 4) any claim where the transfer was made with the 
intent to defraud an existing creditor or the transfer renders the settlor insolvent; 5) 
any claim for a judgment arising from an action commenced before or within three 
years after the trust is created; 6) any claim if the trust is revocable; and 7) claims of 
                                                 
48  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-9.2-4(a) (2005). 
49 Id. 
50 1999 Nev. Stat. 299. 
51 NEV. REV. STAT. § 166.040(1)(b) (2006). 
52 Id. § 166.015(2).   
53 Id. § 11.190. 
54 2003 Utah Laws 301; see also UTAH CODE ANN. §25-6-14(1)(a) (2006). 
2006]        DOMESTIC ASSET PROTECTION TRUSTS: WHAT’S THE BIG DEAL?          141            
creditors who were induced by the settlor to extend credit by a promise that trust 
assets would be available to the creditor.55 
6.  Other states 
 Missouri enacted a statute in 198956 allowing a trustor to create a self-settled 
discretionary trust for a class of beneficiaries (including the trustor).57  The statute 
provides that trust assets will be protected from creditors unless the transfer to the 
trust was a fraudulent conveyance, the trustor is the sole beneficiary, or the trust is 
revocable.58  Federal courts in Missouri have questioned the effectiveness of the 
statute;59 however, and Missouri estate planners do not rely on the statute.60 
 In 1999, a Texas legislator introduced a bill identical to the Alaska Act, but 
the Texas House never acted upon it.61  In addition, New York considered, but did 
not adopt, APT legislation in 2003.62   
III. ARGUMENTS AGAINST APTS 
 In the wake of the domestic APT legislation, one should pause to consider 
whether this legislation is desirable.  The following sections will discuss the major 
arguments advanced against APTs.   
 
                                                 
55 UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-6-14(c) (2006). 
56 1989 Mo. Laws 145.  
57 MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.5-505 (West 2006). 
58 Id. § 456.5-505(3). 
59 See, e.g., Markmueller v. Case, 51 F.3d 775, 776 n.3 (8th Cir. 1995); In re Enfield, 133 B.R. 515, 519 
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991). 
60 Planning with APTs, supra note 30, at 459. 
61 John K. Eason, Retirement Security Through Asset Protection: The Evolution of Wealth, Privilege, and Policy, 
61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 159, 175 n. 54 (2004). 
62 See Duncan E. Osborne et al., Asset Protection: Trust Planning, SJ036 ALI-ABA 1419, 1437 n. 51 (ALI-
ABA C.L.E. Annual Advanced Course of Study Nov. 17-21, 2003) [hereinafter Osborne et al.].   
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A.  Impairs Moral Duty 
 Probably the most common argument against APTs is that allowing settlors 
to protect assets from claims of their creditors impairs their moral duty to pay their 
debts and to refrain from reckless conduct.63  Liability for civil debts and 
incarceration for criminal activity are the two means by which governments enforce 
the law.64  If a judgment cannot be enforced, liability no longer has any effect.65  One 
commentator actually claims that APTs cause settlors to engage in risky behavior.  
He uses the illustration of a physician deciding which tests to run on a patient: “If 
the physician runs insufficient tests and misdiagnoses the patient, she risks 
malpractice liability . . . .  If, however, the physician can insulate her assets from 
patient claims, she can afford to run fewer tests, because she will not bear the full 
costs of malpractice liability.”66  However, another commentator notes that “the 
magnitude of the effect of an APT on conduct is not known (and perhaps not 
determinable);” therefore he gives little weight to this argument.67  In any case, APTs 
provide no more incentive for their settlors to engage in risky conduct than do 
traditional spendthrift trusts for their beneficiaries. 
B.  Removes Limits of Exempt Property Statutes 
 Federal and state exempt property statutes provide that certain categories of 
property are not included in a debtor’s bankruptcy estate and therefore cannot be 
reached by creditors.  “The limitations in the exempt property statutes reflect the 
judgment of the legislature as to amounts that are appropriately exempt from 
creditor claims . . . .”68  APTs thumb their noses at these statutes because there is no 
                                                 
63 Pallbearers, supra note 1, at 542; Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the Bottom?, 
85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035, 1040-41 (2000) [hereinafter Sterk]. 
64 Pallbearers, supra note 1, at 481. 
65 Id. 
66 Sterk, supra note 63, at 1067. 
67 Pallbearers, supra note 1, at 543. 
68 Pallbearers, supra note 1, at 544. 
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limit on the amount of property that can be transferred into such a trust.69  Likewise, 
there is no limit on the nature of property that the settlor may transfer.70 
C.  Available Only to the Wealthy 
 One author argues that APTs  violate the concept of equal protection of the 
laws because they allow the wealthy to avoid their debts while the poor or the 
middle-class are not given the same opportunity.71  This is purportedly because only 
the wealthy have the financial means to fund an APT.72  However, that same author 
admits that there are a number of other planning options, as well as other aspects of 
the law, of which only the wealthy may take advantage.73  In addition, if the wealthy 
are the only ones able to fund an APT, it follows that perhaps they are the only ones 
in need of such a trust to protect the amount of their assets that exceed the amount 
they need for day-to-day living. 
IV. ARGUMENTS FOR APTS 
 While there are instances in which clients abuse APTs, “[a]lmost all estate 
planning lawyers, almost all of the time, represent honorable, law abiding clients, 
men and women who daily contribute to society by their productivity and with their 
generosity, who pay their bills and their taxes, and who are not deadbeats, cheats, 
frauds or criminals.”74  For these clients, APTs can fit nicely into their estate 
planning and wealth preservation framework.  The following sections discuss the 
major arguments advanced in favor of APTs. 
 
 
 
                                                 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id.  
73 Id. at 545.  Some of these other options will be discussed in section IV. C., infra. 
74 Osborne et al., supra note 62, at 1428. 
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A.  Protects from Meritless Claims 
 Professor Lynn LoPucki wrote an article entitled The Death of Liability,75 
which offered a negative view of “judgment-proofing” strategies such as the APT.  
However, one author argued that the article could have been called The Death of 
Responsibility.76  He cited a case in which the plaintiff was injured while mounting a 
tire on a wheel rim because he admittedly ignored all of the warnings that were 
printed on the tire.77  Interestingly, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiff in that 
case.  The author noted that, “[i]n a system where persons such as [the plaintiff] are 
apparently unwilling to accept responsibility for their own actions, even if they are 
negligent, why should Professor LoPucki or anyone else wonder why there is also 
some number of persons unwilling to accept responsibility for their own liabilities?”78  
He notes that, while some take the view that “people should pay their bills,” others 
note that not all bills (e.g., judgments from meritless claims) are just.79  Because of 
the above-referenced case and many others like it, many people view the United 
States litigation system as extremely pro-plaintiff.80  For this reason, coupled with the 
rising cost of liability insurance and the decreasing scope of coverage, many have 
turned to liability limitation strategies like the APT.81   
 One argument against the assertion that APTs help protect against meritless 
claims is that courts can weed out obviously meritless claims by granting motions to 
dismiss and motions for summary judgment, and by imposing sanctions for frivolous 
claims.82  However, as the case noted above illustrates, these procedural mechanisms 
are not always effective.  The second argument is that legislatures can make changes 
                                                 
75 106 YALE L.J. 1 (1996). 
76 John A. Terrill, II, Domestic Asset Protection Trusts, ALI-ABA C.L.E. Video L. Rev., Nov. 5, 2002, at 
para. II. B. 4 [hereinafter Terrill].  
77 See id. (discussing Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. 1998)). 
78 Terrill, supra note 76, at para. II. B. 6. 
79 Id. at para. II. B. 7. 
80 Pallbearers, supra note 1, at 499. 
81 John K. Eason, Home from the Islands: Domestic Asset Protection Trust Alternatives Impact Traditional Estate 
and Gift Tax Planning Considerations, 52 FLA. L. REV. 41, 46 (2000). 
82 Pallbearers, supra note 1, at 527. 
2006]        DOMESTIC ASSET PROTECTION TRUSTS: WHAT’S THE BIG DEAL?          145            
in the litigation system if they feel that changes are necessary.83  This is seen as a 
better solution than the APT because the APT protects from both meritless and 
meritorious claims.84  The flaw with this argument is that at least some legislators 
believe that changes are necessary.  Several have proposed changes, but no legislature 
has adopted a change that will fix the problem.  If the legislatures will not act, 
individuals have no choice but to act to protect themselves. 
 Professor Lischer has raised another argument against the meritless claims 
defense.  He says that “protection from liability is available to any person who 
desires such protection.  A person can become judgment proof by becoming poor.”85  
Obviously, this is an undesirable alternative for anyone.  One wonders if, given the 
choice, Professor Lischer would rather create an APT or “become poor.” 
 There are other reforms that would be more effective at curbing abuse of 
APTs than banning the use of APTs altogether.  States could place limits on the 
amounts that can be transferred to an APT and require settlors to give public notice 
when they fund such a trust.86  In addition, states already place limits on the types of 
creditors against which APT protection is effective.87 
B.  Allows Settlor to Enjoy Same Benefits Enjoyed by Traditional Spendthrift 
Beneficiaries 
 When a person inherits wealth or is the donee of a gratuitous transfer, he can 
request that the donor place those assets in a spendthrift trust for his benefit.88  
Thus, if self-settled spendthrift trusts are not allowed, people who accumulate wealth 
through their own efforts are disfavored.89  Dean Griswold has stated, “[W]e may 
well question the soundness of a rule which allows a man to hold the bounty of 
                                                 
83 Id. at 528. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 529. 
86 Robert T. Danforth, Rethinking the Law of Creditors’ Rights in Trusts, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 287, 364 (2002) 
[hereinafter Danforth]. 
87 See previous discussion of domestic APT laws at § II B. 
88 Osborne et al., supra n. 62, at 1429. 
89 Planning with APTs, supra note 30, at 433. 
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others free from the claims of his creditors, but denies the same immunity to his 
interest in property which he has accumulated by his own effort.”90   
In addition, beneficiaries of gifts that are not placed in a spendthrift trust may 
be punished for the donor’s failure to plan.91  Similarly, when a court creates a trust 
with a personal injury award, that trust often will be self-settled and therefore subject 
to creditor claims.92  The APT merely allows people to do for themselves what they 
already may do for others.93 
C.  Other Asset Protection Opportunities Already Exist 
 There are various asset protection arrangements currently available in the 
United States.  One example is the family limited partnership.  While a creditor may 
reach an individual’s interest in such a partnership, he usually cannot force the 
liquidation of the partnership in order to reach the underlying assets.94  In addition, 
the partnership is unlikely to distribute profits to the creditor, yet the creditor may 
still become liable for income tax on his share of the undistributed profits.95 
 Also, many states have enacted legislation protecting the homesteads of their 
residents.  While not completely exempt from creditor claims, usually only tax liens, 
purchase-money debt, or debt used to construct or improve the homestead are 
allowed against homestead property.96   
                                                 
90 Osborne et al., supra note 62, at 1429 (quoting ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS, § 474, 
at 542-43 (2d ed. 1947)). 
91 Planning with APTs, supra note 30, at 433. 
92 Id. at 494. 
93 Danforth, supra note 86, at 361. 
94 Osborne et al., supra note 62, at 1437. 
95 Id. (“Even in the absence of distributions, the creditor may be subject to income tax on his share of 
partnership profits.”); see Evans v. Comm’r, 447 F.2d 547 (7th Cir. 1971) (holding that a taxpayer who 
transferred his partnership interest to a corporation in which he was the sole stockholder was no 
longer a partner for federal income tax purposes; instead, the corporation was responsible for the tax 
on its share of partnership income); Rev. Rul. 77-137, 1977-1 C.B. 178 (“An assignee acquiring 
substantially all of the dominion and control over the interest of a limited partner is treated as a 
substituted limited partner for Federal income tax purposes.”).  
96 Osborne et al., supra note 62, at 1434-35. 
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Another available asset protection tool is a retirement savings plan qualified 
under the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”).  ERISA 
sets minimum standards for most pension and health plans in private industry in 
order to provide protection for the individual employees participating in these plans.  
It requires all plans to include a spendthrift provision prohibiting the alienation of 
plan benefits.97 
 Yet another device is the tenancy by the entirety.  Because tenants by the 
entirety own the property as a single unit, neither person can unilaterally sever the 
tenancy.98  Thus in most cases, the creditor of one spouse cannot take that spouse’s 
interest in the property without the consent of the other spouse.99  The problem with 
a tenancy by the entirety is that it is available only to married couples, and some 
jurisdictions do not recognize it at all.  The APT can provide protection to anyone 
who chooses to settle one. 
 In addition to the formal arrangements noted above, property owners may 
choose informal means of protecting their assets.  For example, the owner could 
transfer the property in trust, listing family members as beneficiaries.  The owner 
could then grant a power of appointment to a trusted relative, who could then direct 
that trust assets be distributed back to the settlor.100  The owner also could transfer 
property outright to a family member, with the understanding that the property 
would be used for the benefit of the donor.  The problem with both of these 
solutions is that the donor cannot enforce any promise made by the trusted family 
member to use the property for the donor’s benefit.  With an APT, although a settlor 
usually cannot retain a right to mandatory distributions, he still may bring an action 
against the trustee for abuse of discretion if the trustee refuses to distribute trust 
assets to him, especially if the settlor is the only beneficiary. 
D.  Valid Estate Planning Purposes 
 Many people would like to make large inter vivos gifts in order to minimize 
the size of their estates for tax purposes when they pass away.  However, some 
people worry that they may need those assets in the future and are reluctant to give 
                                                 
97 Danforth, supra note 86, at 337. 
98 Id. at 334. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 343.  
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up complete control over the assets while they are still living.101  An APT may 
potentially remove the trust assets from the settlor’s estate while still allowing the 
trustee to make discretionary distributions to the settlor if the settlor later requires 
some of those assets.   
 In order to remove property from his estate, the settlor must make a 
completed gift of the property to the trust.  Settlors make completed gifts when they 
have given up “dominion and control” of the assets.102  If settlors retain a special 
power of appointment over the trust assets or if they retain the right to mandatory 
distributions of income or principal, they do not part with control of the property 
and thus do not make a completed gift.103 
 One test that the Internal Revenue Service (“the Service”) has used to 
determine whether or not a gift is complete is the “reach of the creditor” test.  The 
Service ruled that if settlors “could . . . effectively enjoy all the trust income by 
relegating [their] creditors to the trust for settlement of their claims,” they have not 
made completed gifts.104  In that same ruling, the Service noted that if the settlor 
moved the trust to a state where his or her creditors could not reach the trust assets, 
the transfer would be a completed gift for tax purposes.105  Thus, if an APT is 
enforceable, the settlor’s creditors cannot reach the trust assets, and the settlor can 
make a completed gift and exclude the trust assets from his or her estate.  
 The trust laws of each APT state allow certain types of creditors to attach 
trust assets.  These exceptions could cause the transfer not to be a completed gift.106  
A stringent rule requiring a trust to be totally infallible, however, would mean that no 
APT could avoid estate inclusion.  Interestingly, the Service has indicated that 
                                                 
101 Terrill, supra note 76, at para. IV. A (referencing paragraph titled “Tax Consequences of Domestic 
Asset Protection Trusts”). 
102 Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b) (2006). 
103 Id. 
104 Rev. Rul. 76-103, 1976-1 C.B. 293. 
105 Id. 
106 See Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(b)(2) (2006) (stating that “[t]he ‘use, possession, right to the income, or 
other enjoyment of the transferred property’ is considered as having been retained by or reserved to 
the decedent to the extent that [it] . . . is to be applied toward the discharge of a legal obligation of the 
decedent, . . . [including] a legal obligation to support a dependent during the decedent’s lifetime.”). 
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completed gifts are indeed possible with APTs.  In Private Letter Ruling 98-37-007, 
the Service ruled that a transfer to an Alaska APT was a completed gift.107  The 
Service later ruled that several transfers to California self-settled trusts were not 
completed gifts, but this was because California does not recognize self-settled 
trusts.108  One author reports two instances in which a settlor reported the creation 
of a Delaware APT as a completed gift and paid the required gift tax.109  When the 
settlor passed away, the Service did not attempt to include the trust assets in his 
estate.110   
1.  How to Do it Right 
Although there is good authority for the argument that APTs would allow 
assets to be excluded from the settlor’s estate for tax purposes and thus that APTs 
serve a valid estate planning purpose, the practitioner can and should take steps to 
ensure that his client does not have a fraudulent purpose for creating the trust.  
These same steps can help defend the trust against later attacks.  One practitioner 
notes: 
The “best candidate” for a domestic asset protection trust is a client 
who: 1. Has no current creditor problems (or has assets in excess of 
what is needed to cover existing and foreseeable claims); 2. Has a 
general concern about future claims by creditors; 3. Has assets that 
will not be needed to meet current and foreseeable living expenses; 
and 4. Will not want frequent access to the assets being protected.111 
Practitioners should first do a solvency analysis of the client, making a list of all the 
client’s assets and then subtracting “the value of all debts, liabilities, claims, 
contingent liabilities, threats, guarantees, contingent claims, pending lawsuits, and 
potential claims faced by the client,”112 as well as all assets currently protected from 
                                                 
107 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-37-007 (July 10, 1998). 
108 I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 1999-17-001 (Jan. 15, 1999). 
109 See Planning with APTs, supra note 30, at 464. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 430. 
112 Osborne et al., supra note 62, at 1432.  Alaska now requires settlors to sign a solvency affidavit 
before they can transfer assets to an Alaska APT.  ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110(j)(2) (2006). 
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creditors.  The practitioner should then fund the trust with only a portion of the 
leftover assets so that the transfer does not render the settlor insolvent.113  Because 
fraudulent transfer statutes require proof that the transfer placed the transferor at 
risk of being unable to satisfy his obligations, courts are more likely to uphold the 
transfer if the settlor did not place all of his or her available assets into the trust.114  
In addition, practitioners should make sure that settlors understand they will not 
have access to the trust assets whenever they wish.  One practitioner suggests that 
the trustor should include other beneficiaries in addition to himself and that, if 
possible, the trustee should never distribute trust assets to the trustor.115  If the settlor 
understands this concept from the beginning and still wants to create the APT, he or 
she probably has a legitimate estate planning motive. 
E.  Economic Stimulus: Keeps Assets in the U.S. 
 Corporate trustees, estate planning lawyers, and settlors presumably all 
benefit financially from the use of APTs.  Obviously, some of these benefits flow 
back into the economy of the states allowing APTs (since at least one trustee must 
be located in the APT state) and even states that do not allow APTs (from settlors, if 
they are not domiciliaries of an APT state, because they may continue to use some of 
the trust assets to purchase goods and services in their home states).  Moreover, 
trustees must invest the trust assets, and they will probably be conservative in making 
distributions; thus the trust encourages savings.116  The rise of domestic APTs should 
allow substantial amounts of assets to be invested in the United States rather than 
being transferred to the foreign trustee of an offshore trust. 
F.  Encourages More Due Diligence from Creditors 
 Currently, APTs are more likely to involve settlors with consumer debt, 
rather than with high-dollar commercial debt.117  In the past several years, much of 
that consumer credit came from unsolicited “pre-approved” credit card offers in the 
mail.  The “due diligence” (if one could call it that) of these creditors consists of, 
                                                 
113 See Osborne et al., supra note 62, at 1433. 
114 Danforth, supra note 86, at 332. 
115 Planning with APTs, supra note 30, at 514, 517. 
116 Danforth, supra note 86, at 362. 
117 Pallbearers, supra note 1, at 532. 
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perhaps, a cursory review of the proposed debtor’s credit report and nothing more.  
The opponents of APTs suggest that, if a state allows APTs, it might discourage the 
extension of such unsecured credit because those loans would become essentially 
nonrecourse to the extent of the properties the settlor has transferred to an APT.118  
However, APTs could potentially benefit the public by encouraging all creditors to 
actually be diligent in extending credit, thereby reducing credit losses and decreasing 
the burden that those losses place on the public in the form of higher interest rates 
and fees.119  Lenders could, at the least, request information concerning any assets in 
a self-settled spendthrift trust so that they can determine whether the debtor is 
approaching insolvency, or they could require security for loans they extend to 
settlors of APTs.  
G.  Income Tax Issue 
 In addition to the estate tax benefits a settlor can gain from an APT, he may 
also receive income tax benefits.  If the settlor’s transfer to the APT is a completed 
transfer, then the trustee is the legal owner of the property.120  Therefore, the trust, 
rather than the settlor, is the appropriate taxpayer for the income, deductions, and 
credits attributable to the trust property.121  When the settlor is also a permissible 
beneficiary of the trust, however, an additional requirement must be satisfied to 
prevent the settlor from being taxed on trust income whether or not it is actually 
distributed to him.  Settlors can only avoid this tax liability if the trustee may only 
distribute income to them with the consent of an “adverse party.”122  This requires 
that the settlor name additional trust beneficiaries, because the Code defines 
“adverse party” as “any person having a substantial beneficial interest in the trust 
which would be adversely affected by the exercise or nonexercise of the power which 
he possesses respecting the trust.”123 
 
                                                 
118 Id. at 546. 
119 Id. at 534. 
120 See id. at 560. 
121 Id.  
122 I.R.C. § 677(a)(1) (2005). 
123 I.R.C. § 672(a) (2005). 
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H.  Harshness of the Traditional Rule 
 The Restatement rule allowing creditors access to property held in a self-
settled spendthrift trust actually gives creditors more rights than the settlor.124  With 
domestic APTs, settlors usually cannot retain the right to compel distributions. 
Under the Restatement rule, however, their creditors can do essentially that.125  In 
addition, the Restatement rule applies regardless of whether or not there are other 
trust beneficiaries in addition to the settlor.126  The rule allows creditors of the settlor 
to access property in which other parties have a beneficial interest.127 
V.  WHY APTS MAY NOT WORK 
 Although the statutes of the five APT states allow considerably more 
protection than the traditional rule offers, these states are still not as effective as 
offshore jurisdictions at protecting assets from the settlor’s creditors.  A variety of 
constitutional provisions prevent domestic venues from offering the same protection 
as their offshore counterparts.  The sections that follow will discuss those provisions 
as well as other possible impediments. 
A.  Full Faith and Credit Clause 
 The Constitution requires all states to give “Full Faith and Credit” to 
judgments rendered by the courts of other states.128  Therefore, if a creditor sues a 
debtor in a non-APT state and wins a judgment, he should be able to enforce that 
judgment in an APT state against trust assets, even though the non-APT state court 
may have misinterpreted or declined to apply the law of the APT state.129  However, 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require the APT state to enforce a 
judgment if the non-APT forum did not have jurisdiction over either the trust assets 
                                                 
124 Danforth, supra note 84, at 295. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
129 Osborne et al., supra note 62, at 1444-45. 
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or the trustee.130  To prevent a non-APT court from having jurisdiction, the trustee 
should be a resident of the APT state or a corporation doing business only in the 
APT state (so that it does not have “minimum contacts”131 with the forum state), and 
the trustee should hold all trust assets within the APT state (so that a non-APT court 
cannot have in rem jurisdiction over trust assets).132 
B.  Contracts Clause 
 The Contracts Clause prohibits states from enacting laws that impair the 
obligation of contracts.133  This provision “was specifically intended by the framers 
to prevent the states from passing extensive debtor relief laws.”134  A state’s law 
violates this clause if it “substantially impair[s] the obligations of parties to existing 
contracts or make[s] them unreasonably difficult to enforce.”135  These laws will be 
subject to the “strict scrutiny” standard of review and thus must be narrowly tailored 
to further a compelling government interest.136  APTs, however, should not be 
vulnerable under this provision because the clause prohibits impairment of existing 
contracts, and most APTs have an exception that allows creditors existing at the time 
the trust is created to bring claims within a certain number of years.137 
C.  Supremacy Clause/Bankruptcy Law 
 Section 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that “[a] restriction on 
the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under 
applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under this title.”138  This would 
                                                 
130 See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).  This case involved a traditional trust rather than an 
APT.  The Supreme Court held that a Delaware Court did not have to give full faith and credit to a 
Florida judgment when the Florida court lacked jurisdiction over the trustee.  Id. at 255. 
131 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
132 Planning with APTs, supra note 30, at 466. 
133 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
134 Osborne et al., supra note 62, at 1446. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Planning with APTs, supra note 30, at 489. 
138 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (2006). 
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appear to include restrictions of an APT, thus excluding APT assets from the 
debtor’s bankruptcy estate.  However, the legislative history of the statute mentions 
“spendthrift trusts,” and one could argue that the legislature had traditional 
spendthrift trusts in mind and did not contemplate the future use of self-settled 
spendthrift trusts.139  Also, “[b]ecause bankruptcy cases are not diversity cases, the 
bankruptcy court is not required to apply local choice-of-law rules.”140  Bankruptcy 
courts use federal principles in deciding which state’s law to apply in resolving 
questions of federal law.141  This allows the court to ignore local rules when there are 
“controversies implicating important federal bankruptcy policy.”142  In addition, 
bankruptcy courts have national jurisdiction.143  Thus they can render a valid 
judgment against the trustee or trust assets no matter where they are located in the 
United States.144   
D.  Creditors May Sue Outside the APT State 
 Another state’s courts may have jurisdiction over the trustee or the trust 
assets, depending on where they are located.  In addition, corporate trustees will be 
subject to the jurisdiction of any state in which they do business.  The Restatement 
(Second) of Conflict of Laws section 270 provides as follows: 
An inter vivos trust of interests in movables is valid if valid . . . under 
the local law of the state designated . . . to govern the validity of the 
trust, provided that this state has a substantial relation to the trust 
and that the application of its law does not violate a strong public 
policy of the state with which . . . the trust has its most significant 
relationship . . . .145 
                                                 
139 Osborne et al., supra note 62, at 1445. 
140 Michael Sjuggerud, Defeating the Self-Settled Spendthrift Trust in Bankruptcy, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 977, 
988 (2001).  
141 See In re Koreag, 961 F.2d 341, 350 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[F]ederal principles should guide our 
consideration of which jurisdiction’s substantive law applies in cases arising out of federal law.”). 
142 Id. at 350-51. 
143 28 U.S.C. §1334(e)(1); In re Cardinal Indus., Inc., 109 B.R. 748, 751-52 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989).  
144 Gingiss, supra note 3, at 1012.  
145 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 270 (1971). 
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Thus a creditor may argue that APTs offend the public policy of the forum state so 
the court should ignore the trust’s governing law.  This would be an especially 
compelling argument in the case of a forum state resident who settles an APT in a 
different state, in a dispute with a creditor that is resident in the forum state, over a 
transaction that occurred solely in the forum state.146  Section 273 of the 
Restatement, however, provides that “[w]hether the interest of a beneficiary of a 
trust . . . is assignable by him and can be reached by his creditors is determined . . . 
by the local law of the state . . . in which the settlor has manifested an intention that 
the trust is to be administered.”147  This section does not provide a different rule in 
the case where the trust’s governing law violates a strong public policy of the forum 
state.148  At least one practitioner argues that this means that a court should follow a 
trust’s governing law without question when addressing the ability of creditors to 
reach trust assets.149   
 There are at least two ways for trustees to avoid having out-of-state courts 
enter judgments against them.  First, they can refuse to appear in the out-of-state 
court.  If they appear, they are in effect conceding that the out-of-state court has 
jurisdiction over them, and the jurisdictional issue cannot later be relitigated in an 
enforcement action in the APT state.  If they do not appear, however, the out-of-
state court will enter a default judgment against them, but an APT state court may 
later refuse to enforce the judgment against trust assets because it may decide that 
the out-of-state court did not have jurisdiction over the trustee.150 
 The trustee’s second option is to take an offensive posture and bring a 
declaratory judgment action in the APT state.  Obviously, the APT state will use its 
own law to uphold the trust, and the Full Faith and Credit Clause will require other 
states to uphold that judgment.  Although the APT state courts may not have 
personal jurisdiction over the creditor, they will most likely have jurisdiction over the 
trust assets, since all APT statutes require at least some of the assets to be held 
within the APT state.  If the trustee sends notice of the proceeding to the creditor 
and gives him an opportunity to come defend his position, the creditor can still be 
                                                 
146 Pallbearers, supra note 1, at 555. 
147 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 273 (1971).  
148 Planning with APTs, supra note 30, at 470. 
149 See id.  
150 Danforth, supra note 86, at 321-22. 
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bound by the judgment of the APT state.151  Thus, creditors existing at the time of 
the declaratory action will be estopped from bringing later challenges to the trust. 
VI. WHY APTS COULD WORK 
 Section 156 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts contains over 100 
annotations concerning self-settled trust cases.  One APT state practitioner notes 
that “clients create such trusts even when they know that they might not work” due 
to the chance that they could be effective.152  The following sections discuss the 
factors that provide hope to domestic APT settlors. 
A.  Full Faith and Credit Clause Applies to Legislative Acts 
 The Full Faith and Credit Clause applies to acts as well as judgments.  
However, the Supreme Court has noted that “[o]ur precedent differentiates the 
credit owed to laws . . . and to judgments” and that the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
does not require “a state to substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes 
dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate.”153  Thus, 
this is a fairly weak argument that courts must give effect to the laws of other states.  
However, in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,154 the Supreme Court did not allow a court 
to ignore another state’s statutes, holding that Kansas could not apply its own law to 
all members of a class merely because it had jurisdiction over the parties, who had no 
other relationship to Kansas.155  In addition, the APT statutes all allow actions to 
enforce judgments within a certain time period after the settlor transfers assets to the 
trust.  Several courts have held that a time limitation on such actions (rather than an 
outright ban) is procedural rather than substantive and therefore does not violate the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause.156   
                                                 
151 Sterk, supra note 63, at 1112-13. 
152 Planning with APTs, supra note 30, at 434.   
153 Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 494 (2003) (quoting Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 
U.S. 222, 232 (1998)). 
154 472 U.S. 797 (1985). 
155 Id. at 822. 
156 See, e.g., Matanuska Valley Lines, Inc. v. Molitor, 365 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1966); Foley v. Foley, 641 
S.W.2d 138 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Wener v. Perone & Cramer Realty, Inc., 528 S.E.2d 65 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2000); Oakley v. Wagner, 431 S.E.2d 676 (W. Va. 1993). 
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B.  “Applicable Nonbankruptcy Law” 
 As noted above, section 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a 
spendthrift restriction enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is also 
enforceable under the Bankruptcy Code.  Although some argue that this provision 
only extends to traditional spendthrift restrictions and not those found in self-settled 
trusts, the Supreme Court has held that an ERISA-qualified savings plan is 
excludable from the bankruptcy estate under this provision.157  The Court stated that 
“[t]he natural reading of [section 541(c)(2)] entitles a debtor to exclude from . . . the 
estate any interest in a plan or trust that contains a transfer restriction enforceable 
under any relevant nonbankruptcy law.”158  Retirement plans are arguably self-settled 
because the employee makes contributions or his employer makes contributions as 
part of the employee’s compensation package.  Because ERISA requires qualified 
plans to contain anti-alienation clauses, it appears that the Supreme Court is in effect 
saying that transfer restrictions in self-settled trusts make the assets in those trusts 
excludable from the bankruptcy estate.  However, the author found no bankruptcy 
case to date in which a court has decided whether section 541(c)(2) applies to 
domestic self-settled spendthrift trusts.   
C.  State Exemption Rules 
 Even if spendthrift provisions in self-settled trusts are not excludable from 
the bankruptcy estate under “applicable nonbankruptcy law,” they could be 
respected independently as a state exemption rule.  However, the exemptions that 
the bankruptcy court will apply are those of the debtor’s state of domicile,159 so this 
argument would be effective only in the case of a debtor who is a resident of an APT 
state. 
VII. WHY APTS ARE NOT SUCH A BIG DEAL 
 Many authors express outrage that some states now allow wealthy settlors to 
retain the enjoyment of their property while their creditors go unsatisfied.  Some 
essentially predict the country’s moral downfall due to this horrendous new “trick” 
up the sleeves of wealth protection planners.  But is all the outrage really warranted?  
One professor has stated, “The treatment of spendthrift trusts can make a nice legal 
                                                 
157 Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992). 
158 Id. at 758 (emphasis added). 
159 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2) (2006). 
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point . . . but it strains credibility to believe that a change in the law will affect more 
than a handful of people each year.”160  As of 2003, a little over five years after the 
first APT legislation became effective, a Delaware practitioner estimated that “a few 
hundred” Delaware APTs had been created with a market value exceeding $2 
billion.161  He also indicated that “several” Nevada APTs and “a few” Rhode Island 
APTs had been created.162  An Alaska practitioner estimated that 310 nonresidents 
and 125 residents of Alaska had created Alaska APTs.163  It is almost certain that 
more trusts have been created in the last couple of years, but these numbers are still 
not astronomical considering the total population of the United States, or even the 
population of the APT states alone.  Despite hundreds of trusts being created, 
however, the author has been unable to find any case in which a creditor has brought 
a challenge to a domestic APT.  In addition, the number of bankruptcy filings in 
Alaska from 1997 to present and in Utah from 2003 to present has remained roughly 
the same.164  Statistics from Delaware show that the number of bankruptcy filings 
between 1997 and 2001 nearly doubled, but this could be due to the introduction of 
a new computer system in 2001 that does not continue to track cases filed and 
resolved prior to that date.165  In any case, this information may indicate that perhaps 
the settlors of these trusts really have legitimate motives other than thwarting courts 
and creditors.  And for those few settlors who intend to abuse the system (for there 
will always be abuse, whether it is of the APT system, available tax planning devices, 
or something else), there are other disincentives more powerful than negative APT 
commentary.  For example, concealing or failing to disclose any property from the 
court in a bankruptcy case is a crime punishable by a $5,000 fine, a five-year prison 
term, or both.166  Even if the debtor does not commit a crime, the bankruptcy court 
                                                 
160 Elizabeth Warren, Reducing Bankruptcy Protection for Consumers: A Response, 72 GEO. L.J. 1333, 1335 n. 
17 (1984). 
161 Planning with APTs, supra note 30, at 443. 
162 Id. at 454, 457. 
163 Id. at 450 (citing David G. Shaftel, Alaska’s Experience with Self-Settled Discretionary Spendthrift Trusts, 
29 EST. PLAN. 506, 506 (Oct. 2002)).  
164 See Statistics for U.S. Bankruptcy Court, District of Alaska, 
http://www.akb.uscourts.gov/stats.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2006); Bankruptcy Filing Statistics for 
the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, District of Utah, 
http://www.utb.uscourts.gov/clerks_office/statistics.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2006). 
165 This information was obtained through e-mail from Deborah Colmyer, Process Specialist, U.S. 
Bankruptcy Court, District of Delaware (July 11, 2005).  E-mail on file with the author.  
166 18 U.S.C. § 152 (2006). 
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can find that he is not entitled to a discharge from his debts because he transferred 
property “with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor” within one year before 
filing his bankruptcy petition.167  Even outside the realm of bankruptcy, defrauding 
creditors is a crime under several other state and federal laws.168   
CONCLUSION 
Asset protection trusts are merely the newest in a long line of asset 
protection devices, and they are subject to abuse as much as virtually any other legal 
device.169  As with other devices, however, for the most part APT settlors will have 
honest motives and should be allowed to protect the assets they have amassed 
through years of working and prudent investing.  Eventually all the commentators 
will realize that APTs are really no big deal. 
                                                 
167 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2) (2006). 
168 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 658 (2006); ALA. CODE § 13A-9-48 (2006); ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.730 (2006); 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 892 (2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-607 (2006). 
169 See Osborne et al., supra note 62, at 1432 (“Despite numerous . . . abuses in tax planning, no one 
has yet called for an end to tax planning. . . .  [T]hough there have been abuses of asset protection 
planning tools and methods, that should not end the right to asset protection planning for those 
clients who are willing to play by the rules.”). 
  
